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The impact of a psychiatric diagnosis on the self-narrative of the recipient 
 
Abstract 
A psychiatric diagnosis can have a range of effects on the person receiving it. Some welcome 
the diagnosis, seeing it as an explanation for their distress, while others perceive it as an 
unwelcome medicalized label impinging negatively on their sense of themselves as rational 
agents. I focus on how the diagnosis affects the latter group, and in particular how it may 
impact on their self-narratives. I therefore outline some key themes in narrative theory which 
have been explored in various ways by philosophers, though to a lesser extent by 
psychologists. These theorists emphasise the importance of self-narratives in human 
psychology. I argue that those receiving a psychiatric diagnosis may be vulnerable to 
experiences of epistemic injustice, as described by Miranda Fricker. This includes what 
Fricker describes as hermeneutical injustice, where individuals lack the ability to understand 
their experiences or difficulties in ways that make sense to them. The medicalization implicit 
in psychiatric diagnoses conveys a particular kind of narrative which may conflict with the 
recipient¶s previous self-narratives. When such effects occur, they may reduce the recipient¶s 
sense of agency and induce feelings of hopelessness about recovery, which may then limit the 
prospect of a positive outcome for the person concerned. A greater use of formulation could 
mitigate those effects. 
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Introduction 
There has been little systematic empirical investigation of the effects of receiving a 
psychiatric diagnosis on its recipients. In contrast, there are many anecdotal reports in various 
publications. Drawing general conclusions from these is difficult, but they seem to fall 
roughly into two broad categories. Firstly, there are those who seem to welcome their 
diagnosis as providing an apparent explanation for their difficulties. Secondly, there are 
others who find their diagnosis diminishing or oppressive in some way. These differing 
reactions are exemplified in a short video posted on the BBC website (BBC, 2018) in which 
users of mental health services describe their reaction to their diagnosis. One talks positively 
about a diagnosis of bipolar disorder: µpeople suddenly realised I wasn¶t doing things for 
attention... It was because I have a brain disorder¶. In contrast, another says: µI hate my 
diagnosis. The main one I have is borderline personality disorder and I hate it with a passion. 
People start seeing you differently¶. 
This paper focusses on the second group, those who find their diagnosis oppressive, 
with the aim of arguing that in many cases their experiences can be understood as instances 
of epistemic injustice. A central aim is to argue that this can be understood in terms of 
narrative theory ± LHWKHLPSDFWWKDWDGLDJQRVLVKDVRQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVHOI-narrative. The 
QDUUDWLYHRIWHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDSV\FKLDWULFGLDJQRVLVLVWKDWWKHFRQGLWLRQLV³DGLVHDVHOLNH
DQ\RWKHU´ (e.g. Malla, Joober, & Garcia, 2015). However, most psychiatric diagnoses, being 
broadly descriptive labels, do not have the same explanatory value as other diagnoses, though 
they may appear to. Nevertheless, the disease narrative that can be conveyed by the diagnosis 
may be taken to imply that the individual¶Vpsychological reactions and experiences of 
distress are attributable to some kind of brain disease. Narrative theory is therefore a suitable 
framework for understanding how this implication might affect the self-narratives of the 
individuals concerned, particularly by changing the meanings they have previously created 
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through their own self-narratives. I argue that this change can be seen as an example of 
epistemic injustice, and specifically of hermeneutical injustice. 
 
Narrative theory 
Narrativity is concerned with the idea that we live and order our lives according to implicit or 
explicit narratives of some kind. We experience our lives in time ± narratives have a temporal 
or linear structure ± and the stories we construct about our lives in some way shape who we 
are. Narratives and stories are omnipresent in our culture, such as in myths, literature, drama, 
films, television soap-operas, biography, and so on. The autobiographies we construct for 
ourselves may not have the ordered aesthetic structure of narratives in literature or drama, but 
they are nevertheless vehicles that carry meaning for us. However, despite being a central 
aspect of human psychological life, narrativity seems to have been relatively neglected by 
experimental psychology (although narrative therapy is a frequently used approach in 
psychotherapy), possibly because it does not lend itself to study in line with the dominant 
paradigm of quantitative methodology.  
However, this is a subject which has engaged many philosophers, some of whom 
emphasise the importance of narratives for constructing a sense of self. For example, Daniel 
Dennett (1991) has described KRZRQH¶V self-narrative forms an ongoing autobiography with 
the self at its centre. The self, as Dennett conceives it, is not a metaphysical entity, but a 
useful abstraction, analogous to the centre of a gravity of an object which fulfils a distinct 
explanatory purpose. In a similar vein, Marya Schechtman (1997) describes what she calls 
WKHµQDUUDWLYHVHOI-FRQVWLWXWLRQ¶YLHZ$FFRUGLQJWRher accountDSHUVRQ¶VVHOI-narrative is 
what constitutes her identity or self ± this is conceived by her as the µSKHQRPHQRORJLFDO¶Velf. 
A central theme in accounts of narrativity is the emphasis of the role of self-narratives 
in generating intelligibility or meaning for how people understand their lives. Thus, Alisdair 
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MacIntyre (2007) emphasises the importance of the concept of intelligibility for 
understanding human actions, both of ourselves and of others. He says: µ«WKHFRQFHSWRIDQ
intelligible action is a more fundamental concept than that of an action as such¶ (p.209). 
Narratives represent the vehicle by which this is attained. For MacIntyre, this is an important 
thesis: µ«PDQLVLQKLVDFWLRQVDQGSUDFWLFHDVZHOODVLQKLVILFWLRQVessentially a story-
telling animal¶ (ibid, p.216, emphasis added). Actions only become intelligible by virtue of 
their place in a narrative. It is the centrality of intelligibility which, according to MacIntyre, 
also means that behaviourism can never be an adequate science of psychology ± it cannot be 
anything more than a science of uninterpreted behaviours. 
Importantly however, we are far from being in full control of our narratives. As 
MacIntyre notes, we enter society as young children with a set of stories given to us. We have 
to learn what these are and what roles they confer on us. As we do so, we gradually develop 
our own self-narratives. Nevertheless, we are always constrained in the narratives we 
construct by the personal and social circumstances in which we are living and by the 
narratives which others have of us. We are also actors in other people¶s narratives, such that 
their narratives may influence our own. In normal circumstances, however, we expect our 
self-narratives and the narratives that others have of us to be broadly consistent. 
One psychologist who has emphasised the importance of narratives is Jerome Bruner 
(1990). Where MacIntyre talks about the role of narratives in making their subjects¶ actions 
intelligible, Bruner explains how narratives create meanings for their authors. He started his 
career as one of the pioneers of the cognitive revolution breaking with behaviourism. 
However, this revolution, which was expected µWREULQJ³PLQG´EDFNLQWRWKHKXPDQVFLHQFHV
DIWHUDORQJFROGZLQWHURIREMHFWLYLVP¶(1990, p.1), became diverted away from its original 
impulse and into technical issues based on the computation metaphor. He observes that: 
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µ9HU\VRRQFRPSXWLQJEHFDPHWKHPRGHORIWKHPLQGDQGLQSODFHRIWKHFRQFHSWRI
PHDQLQJWKHUHHPHUJHGWKHFRQFHSWRIFRPSXWDELOLW\¶LELG p.6). 
Bruner subsequently moved into the study of early language development in children 
and then progressed into studying how children become inducted into their culture by means 
of their language. He maintains that an essential process in their enculturation is their 
adoption of the prevailing narratives of their immediate social environment, which are 
provided initially by their parents and later by other social contacts. Bruner describes such a 
process of narrative creation as reflecting the µcultural shaping of meaning-making, and the 
central place it plays in human action¶ (ibid, p.xii). Through the process of receiving 
culturally appropriate narratives and adopting them as their own, children gain a sense of 
their own identity. This gives continuing meaning to their lives and their actions, and it forms 
the basis of their own narratives. Bruner also emphasizes the moral dimension to the stories 
we tell about ourselves. He says: 
«WKH larger story reveals a strong rhetorical strand, as if justifying why it was 
necessary (not causally, but morally, socially, psychologically) that the life had gone a 
particular way. The Self as narrator not only recounts but justifies (ibid, p.121, 
emphasis in original). 
This aspect of narrativity may become particularly salient for individuals who experience 
difficulty in justifying their existing self-narratives when confronted with a radically different 
narrative conflicting strongly with it. 
As noted, there are always constraints on our narratives. At certain times in our lives 
these constraints may assume a great deal of power over us, to the extent of forcing changes 
in the narratives we construct for ourselves. This can particularly be the case when an 
individual receives a psychiatric diagnosis which they neither seek nor understand. 
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The impact of a psychiatric diagnosis 
Whilst psychiatric diagnoses may convey different meanings to different people, they are 
given in a medicalized environment by people with medical qualifications. In somatic 
medicine, diagnoses are generally understood (with some exceptions) to convey explanatory 
information (e.g. Maung, 2017; Stegenga, 2018). Typically, diagnosis in medicine is linked 
with the notion of disease specificity ± i.e. that a diagnosis names a disease entity of some 
kind. In psychiatry, the idea that psychiatric diagnoses represent disease entities is often 
reinforced, partly by the frequent prescribing of psychoactive drugs (Rosenberg, 2006). This 
is likely to promote a biomedical narrative about the SDWLHQW¶V condition, with the 
accompanying implication that the condition can be thought of as similar to any other 
disease, such as diabetes or asthma. 
7KHPDQQHULQZKLFKDSV\FKLDWULFGLDJQRVLVFDQLPSDFWRQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVHOI-
narrDWLYHLVGLVFXVVHGE\ùHULIH7HNLQShe reiterates the features of narrativity 
discussed by other philosophers, and in addition emphasises the distinction between the 
narrative authored by the individual and that received from their social environment. This 
distinction can assume particular salience when an individual receives a diagnosis, whether 
medical or psychiatric. To receive a diagnosis is to be told something important about 
oneself. For many illnesses this may be of little enduring consequence, but for chronic or life-
WKUHDWHQLQJGLVHDVHVWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVHOI-narrative is bound to be altered to some degree, 
possibly to the extent of requiring the sufferer to re-conceive the meaning of their life in the 
most severe cases. 
In the case of psychiatric diagnoses, this can have additional significance. Tekin argues 
that a DSM diagnosis can itself function as a source of narrative for the person concerned. 
She suggests that, in some cases, the patient may find it easy to understand their experience 
in terms of an established medical diagnostic category. In other cases, however, patients may 
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find that a diagnosis is imposed upon them that prevents them framing their experience in any 
way other than as a kind of neurochemical imbalance, which then becomes the dominant 
narrative. The biomedical determinism which this implies can limit their hopes for recovery 
and the disempowering self-narrative generated can become self-reinforcing (e.g. Yanos et 
al., 2010). In the case of those people who find their diagnoses oppressive, such experiences 
can be seen as instances of epistemic injustice, and in particular of hermeneutical injustice. 
 
Epistemic injustice 
The concept of epistemic injustice was introduced by Miranda Fricker (2007). It concerns the 
ethical dimension of the epistemic activities in which we are habitually involved ± i.e. the 
activities of reasoning, believing and knowing, giving testimony, and interpreting our 
experience. Inasmuch as we do these, we are epistemic agents. Epistemic injustice, therefore, 
is a harm done to someone in their capacity as an epistemic agent. It is generated by some 
kind of negative identity prejudice towards the victim, and in some cases the victim may have 
internalised the negative identity, whether consciously or unconsciously. Fricker emphasises 
that it occurs in contexts of a power imbalance, in which the victim is situated at a 
disadvantage with regard to the context that allows the injustice to occur. She identifies two 
forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. Testimonial injustice occurs 
when the credibility given to an individual is deflated due to negative identity prejudice and 
their credibility in giving testimony is thereby undermined. Hermeneutic injustice refers to 
the marginalization of DQLQGLYLGXDO¶V social experience due to a structural identity prejudice 
of some kind. It arises where WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V psychological resources for understanding or 
interpreting their experiences are impaired or missing in some respect. 
Instances of epistemic injustice can occur in medical contexts. Havi Carel and Ian Kidd 
(Carel & Kidd, 2014; Kidd & Carel, 2017) explain how such experiences can occur in these 
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contexts. A principle reason for this is the vulnerability felt by patients because of their 
illness. This is accentuated by the power imbalance between them and the healthcare system. 
In particular, doctors and other clinicians occupy a position of authority due to the epistemic 
privilege obtained through their training and qualifications. The authority this confers on 
them gives them the power to define concepts of disease, determine the nature of the disease 
the patient may have, and authorise access to treatment. The biomedical approach to illness 
and the third-person stance as the basis of the medical perspective, which predominates over 
DPRUHSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHFDQOHDGWRDPDUJLQDOL]DWLRQRIWKHSDWLHQW¶V
experience. Patients may often find their experiences being overlooked or negated as a 
consequence of the structures and contingencies of rigid healthcare systems. This may be 
particularly apparent when substantial resource limitations and time pressures lead to 
increased stress among healthcare staff. 
 
Epistemic injustice in mental health service contexts 
Epistemic injustice can be experienced by mental health service users for similar reasons to 
those above, but also specifically as a result of the diagnosis assigned to the individual. The 
assignment of a diagnosis, such as schizophrenia, can render the individual vulnerable to 
having their experiences marginalized. They may experience testimonial injustice when what 
they say is disregarded, because it is assumed their condition causes them to confabulate or 
be unreliable reporters of facts. There are several examples of testimonial injustice in such 
circumstances reported in the literature (e.g. Crichton, Carel & Kidd, 2017; Sanati & 
Kyratsous, 2015). Where this happens, the influence of the diagnosis on the perceptions of 
healthcare staff towards the patient is evident. More generally, patients can fall victim to 
µepistemic silencinJ¶ (Hookway, 2010, p.157) when their views are minimised or not even 
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sought, because they are not judged to be useful participants in their assessment and plans for 
their treatment. 
Such circumstances of epistemic silencing can allow individuals to become victims of 
hermeneutical injustice. Anastasia Scrutton (2017) describes two ways in which this can be 
experienced by people receiving psychiatric care. Firstly, individuals are liable to be treated 
simply as sources of data rather than participants in the diagnostic process. Secondly, the 
experiences they report can be interpreted primarily as symptoms of a diagnostic category, 
with other aspects of their experience being discounted. Psychiatric patients may be 
particularly vulnerable to this kind of injustice when the clinician treats them merely as 
providers of mundane information, rather than as meaningful contributors to their assessment 
or treatment plan. Marginalization in this way can reduce their sense of confidence in the 
value of their own perspectives (Kurs & Grinshpoon, 2018). It can be further reinforced by 
the typical style of psychiatric interviews which are aimed at establishing whether the 
SDWLHQW¶VV\PSWRPVFRQIRUPWRDGLDJQRVWLFFDWHJRU\, thus neglecting the personal meanings 
the symptoms may have for the patient. For example, Giovanni Stanghellini observes that the 
use of standardised psychiatric interviews, intended to increase the reliability of diagnoses, 
are likely to contribute to this tendency: 
7KHµPHDQLQJ¶RIDV\PSWRPLVUHGXFHGWRWKHSURSHUWLHVWKDWFRUUHVSRQGWRRQH
category«7KHUHLVOLWWOHVSDFHIRUSHUVRQDOPHDQLQJVDQGSHUVRQDOQDUUDWLYHV (2004, 
p.184). 
Stanghellini also emphasises how narratives play a central role in creating coherent meaning 
for people in their lives. If the manner in which the psychiatric interview is conducted ignores 
this at a time when the person concerned is experiencing severe distress, their confidence in 
their own psychological resources for making sense of their experiences are likely to be 
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diminished. This is what can lead to the experience of hermeneutical injustice, which can be a 
long-lasting effect. 
Part of the reason for this is the frequent tendency for people to be encouraged to think 
RIWKHLUFRQGLWLRQDV³DQLOOQHVVOLNHDQ\RWKHU´ This is evident from the many personal 
reports of people who have been mental health service users and who have spoken or written 
about their experiences. For example, Jacqui Dillon talks about her experience in the 
following terms: 
7KHFOHDUPHVVDJH,UHFHLYHG«ZDVWKDW,ZDVLOOEverything that I said and did was 
caused by my illness. The abuse never happened ± even thinking it did was part of my 
illness«7KHIDFWWKDW,GLGQ¶WZDQWWRWDNHPHGLFDWLRQZDVEHFDXVH,ZDVLOO,I,
wanted to get better, I must accept my diagnosis and take medication... I would always 
KDYHWKLVLOOQHVV,ZRXOGQ¶WEHDEOHWRZRUN,GLGQ¶WNQRZZKDWZDVEHVWIRUPH,
lacked insight (2011, emphasis in original, pp.144-5). 
Another former mental health service user, Patricia Deegan, is now a clinical psychologist 
and disability rights advocate in the USA. She talks about some of her experiences as 
follows: 
0\SV\FKLDWULVWWROGPH,KDGFKURQLFVFKL]RSKUHQLD«+HVDLG,ZRXOGEHVLFNIRUWKH
rest of my life and the best I could do was avoid stress and cope. Something in me 
fought back against his prognosis of doom. As I stood outside his office, I remember 
rejecting the chronic mental patient life-SODQDQGWKLQNLQJµ,ZLOOEHFRPH'U'HHJDQ
and then I will change the mental health system«¶ (from Deegan, 2004, 
www.patdeegan.com/pat-deegan/lectures/silence; quoted in Phillips, 2013, p.16). 
Both these accounts can be seen as descriptions of hermeneutical injustice, mediated by the 
biomedical narrative with which the diagnosis is associated. They are given by individuals 
who have been able to draw upon sufficient psychological resources to reject the disease 
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label that had been attached to them. In so doing they were able to overcome this kind of 
injustice. 
Many other people, however, will find overcoming such experiences much more 
difficult. This is important because it affects the likelihood of their recovering from the 
conditions which have brought them into contact with mental health services. There is 
evidence that those with a more internal locus of control and a greater sense of empowerment 
are more likely to have a good outcome after an episode of psychosis (Yanos, et al, 2010).1 
Conversely, those with an internalised sense of stigma and a weaker sense of empowerment 
tend to have much poorer outcomes (Warner, 2010). The biomedical narrative, therefore, 
seems to have the effect of reducing WKHSHUVRQ¶VORFXVRIFRQWURODQGsense of empowerment 
with its message that the disease is responsible for their experiences. To the extent that it 
distorts RQH¶V self-narrative and diminishes RQH¶V psychological resources, one can thereby 
become a victim of hermeneutical injustice. 
 
Conclusion 
Psychiatric diagnoses have been widely recognised as lacking validity and explanatory value, 
but they continue to be used, because they are still judged by many psychiatrists to have 
utility (e.g. Jablensky, 2016). So long as they appear to offer some sort of explanation for 
psychological disorders, they will add to the risk that their recipients will be victims of 
epistemic injustice in mental healthcare settings. Alternative approaches that can mitigate or 
avoid such a consequence make greater use of formulation, without the imposition of 
superfluous diagnoses conveying a biomedical narrative (Johnstone & Dallos, 2013). 
                                                        
1
 The concepts of internal locus of control and sense of empowerment may suggest the idea of 
resilience in the person concerned. Resilience seems to be a broad notion encompassing a range of 
psychological and social resources available to the individual. Thus, there seems to be some 
relationship between this and locus of control. A separate paper would be needed to explore this 
question in depth. 
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Reinforcing WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSV\FKRORJLFDOUHVRXUFHVWRhelp them develop their own self-
narrative, such that they feel more empowered to overcome their difficulties, is a key aim of 
formulation in psychological therapy. Narrative therapy is one approach to formulation that 
can be effective in achieving this (e.g. Harper & Spellman, 2016). What helps to make 
formulation into a meaningful exercise is the central role of narrativity in human 
psychological life. 
 
Richard Hassall. 
PhD Candidate, Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield. 
E-mail: hassallr@gmail.com 
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